Mekkora felelőssége volt az angolszász erőknek a magyar Holokausztban? Tényleg egy könnyedebb D-napi partraszállásért kellett meghalnia 600 000 magyarországi zsidónak?

From 1943 onwards, several notes confirm that a potential occupation was in the Allies’ interest. While secret “fake” talks about Hungary’s surrender commenced, the German occupation became Hungary’s fate. According to a note from March 1943, “his Majesty’s government is no longer afraid of German occupation, all the more, it would be a positive development as it would increase the tasks of the German army. Its effect would be even greater if it could be timed by the Allies’ landing.”

Winston Churchill also spoke about it to Roosevelt, arguing that Hitler’s Germany was afraid that Hungary and Romania would quit the war: “If we were able to trigger such a reaction and benefit from it, our position [in Italy] would be much better.” After the two agreed on the exact location of the Landing during a September meeting in Québec, the US chief of staff informed the Foreign Ministry that “it would greatly improve the military situation of the Allies if both countries [Hungary and Romania] or one of the two would break out from the war regardless of whether such a move would certainly lead to the full German occupation of these countries.” The next day, the OSS chief ordered OSS Swiss Resident Allen Dulles, the regular negotiating partner of Hungarian peace delegations, to execute the policy.