A Britek miért mentek volna csődbe már 1915-ben szupermasszív amerikai háborús hitelek nélkül?

Új kérdédés az angol-rajongó angliai mosogatófiúk, pincérkék és szakmelós proletárok rokonságának:

https://www.gyakorikerdesek.hu/tudomanyok__tarsadalomtudoman..

England borrowed quite a bit from the U.S. and it seems unlikely that there were any other sources for the amounts they needed. The numbers are those of John Maynard Keynes and are expressed in millions of Pounds. They are taken from this article that addresses the 100 year anniversary of Keynes’ book The Economic Consequences of the Peace. The article discusses how disordered British finances were as it examines Keynes role in the situation.

The Economic Consequences of the Peace: 100 Years Later | Edward W. Fuller

Loans To: By U.S. By UK By France Total

UK 800 800

France 485 390 875

Italy 275 390 35 700

Russia 38 520 160 718

Belgium 56 90 90 236

Serbia 4 20 30 54

Romania 2 16 35 53

Greece 8 10 15 33

Portugal 10 0 10

Total 1,668 1,451 365 3,484

For comparison, here are England’s revenue and expenditures taken from Devinespark’s link. Again, all numbers are in millions of Pounds.

Revenue

1913-14 198.2

1914-15 226.7

1915-16 336.8

1916-17 573.4

1917-18 707.2

1918-19 889.0

Expenditures

1913-14 197.5

1914-15 560.5

1915-16 1559.2

1916-17 2198.1

1917-18 2696.2

1918-19 2579.3

I find it interesting that the UK borrowed 800 million Pounds all from the U.S but issued loans for amount that approached twice that amount working with an English economy that was less than half the size of the U.S. economy (the economy of the entire British Empire was slightly larger than the U.S. economy.)

There was also currency depreciation of the Pound that later caused major problems when the English over-valued the Pound and wrecked their export trade during the mid-1920’s.

There was quite a bit of profiteering in the U.S. The war was a godsend to the House of Morgan, which received a financial commission on every one of the billions of dollars loaned to the European allies while his associates on the just-established Federal Reserve made sure that credit was plentiful. At war’s peak, Morgan presided each month over purchases which were equal to the gross national product of the entire world just one generation before. The Morgan-dominated newly created Federal Reserve lower interest rates to facility the loaning. The massive debts thus created were a serious source of economic instability after the war.

Indeed, in the very first month of the World War I President Wilson approved a $100 million (at least $5 billion today) Morgan loan to France and as early as September 4, 1914 Morgan had written to the President: “The war should be a tremendous opportunity for America” and by October 15 of the same year US banks were aggressively making war loans – loans made more attractive by the fact that interest rates fell by over 22 percent during 1914 and 1915 as the Federal Reserve helped finance (and lengthen) the war.

In his Wall Street, Banks, and American Foreign Policy, Murray N. Rothbard described the picture in the U.S.:

By 1914, the Morgan empire was in increasingly shaky financial shape. The Morgans had long been committed to railroads, and after the turn of the century the highly subsidized and regulated railroads entered their permanent decline. The Morgans had also not been active enough in the new capital market for industrial securities, which had begun in the 1 890s, allowing Kuhn-Loeb to beat them in the race for industrial finance. To make matters worse, the $400 million Morgan-run New Haven Railroad went bankrupt in 1914.

At the moment of great financial danger for the Morgans, the advent of World War I came as a godsend. Long connected to British, including Rothschild, financial interests, the Morgans leaped into the fray, quickly securing the appointment, for J.P. Morgan & Co., of fiscal agent for the warring British and French governments, and monopoly underwriter for their war bonds in the United States. J.P. Morgan also became the fiscal agent for the Bank of England, the powerful English central bank. Not only that: the Morgans were heavily involved in financing American munitions and other firms exporting war material to Britain and France. J.P. Morgan & Co., moreover, became the central authority organizing and channeling war purchases for the two Allied nations.

he United States had been in a sharp recession during 1913 and 1914; unemployment was high, and many factories were operating at only 60% of capacity. In November 1914, Andrew Carnegie, closely allied with the Morgans ever since his Carnegie Steel Corporation had merged into the formation of United States Steel, wrote to President Wilson lamenting business conditions but happily expecting a great change for the better from Allied purchases of U.S. exports.

Sure enough, war material exports zoomed. Iron and steel exports quintupled from 1914 to 1917, and the average profit rate of iron and steel firms rose from 7.4% to 28.7% from 1915 until 1917. Explosives exports to the Allies rose over ten-fold during 1915 alone. Overall, from 1915 to 1917, the export department of J.P. Morgan and Co. negotiated more than $3 billion of contracts to Britain and France. By early 1915, Secretary McAdoo was writing to Wilson hailing the "great prosperity" being brought by war exports to the Allies, and a prominent business writer wrote the following year that "War, for Europe, is meaning devastation and death; for America a bumper crop of new millionaires and a hectic hastening of prosperity revival."

It was the huge debt hangover and the attempt to address it with additional credit that so disordered Western economies during the 1920’s and formed the backdrop to the crash in 1929.

Canadian citizens and Canadian nationals, 1910–1947

Immigration Act, 1910

Long title

Citation S.C. 1910, c. 27

Assented to 4 May 1910

Status: Repealed

The status of "Canadian citizen" was first created under the Immigration Act, 1910,[5] which included anyone who was:

a person born in Canada who had not become an alien;

a British subject possessing Canadian domicile; and

a person naturalized under the laws of Canada who had not subsequently become an alien or lost Canadian domicile.

Aliens, as well as all other British subjects, who wished to immigrate to Canada required permission to land. "Domicile" was declared to have been acquired by a person having his domicile in Canada for three years after having been landed therein, excluding any time spent in "any penitentiary, jail, reformatory, prison, or asylum for the insane in Canada."[5]

ntil the passing in Australia of the Nationality Act 1920,[9] Australia's nationality law, like that of other Commonwealth countries, was governed by the English common law concept of a British subject. (See also British nationality law.) The idea that there was such a thing as an Australian legal nationality, as distinct from a British one, was considered by the High Court of Australia in 1906 to be a "novel idea" to which it was "not disposed to give any countenance".[10] That was as a matter of law, but in 1913 and 1930 Australian journalists considered that there were such things as Australian nationality and citizenship.[5][6]

The British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, an act of the Westminster parliament, codified the common law rules. Australia followed this with the enacting of the Nationality Act 1920,[9] which came into effect on 1 January 1921 and codified the concept of a British subject in Australia. In general, the principles of the 1920 Act and subsequent amendments followed United Kingdom legislation, although there were some differences that could lead to a person being a British subject solely under Australian law.