A kettős állampolgárság ellenzői inkább bal- vagy jobboldaliak?

Akkor mivel magyarázod, hogy Észak-Írországban (brit koronabirtok) az összes ír alapból az Ír Köztársaság állampolgára? Nem ott élnek, nem ott adóznak, nem ott szavaznak, és mégis. Ha ír útlevelet akarnak, ugyanúgy megkapják, mint bármelyik déli ír.

És hogy fordítva miért nincs szolidaritás? Dehogy nincs: ha Mo-n élő szlovák vagy, te is lehetsz kettős szlovák-magyar állampolgár átköltözés nélkül, és nem kell Szlovákiában adóznod. (Sőt még szlovákul is beszélhetsz nálunk.)

Nem várom, hogy egyből meghajolj az érvek súlya alatt, de elgondolkodni azért érdemes. Ha eltérsz az európai gyakorlattól, legalább körültekintően teszed.

Íme egy vonatkozó anyag, amit kigoogleoltam. Arról szól, mennyire elterjedt Európában a határon túli etnikai nemzettársak kettős állampolgárságának megadása:

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És egy releváns rész (ha időtök engedi, olvassátok el az egészet):

Citizenship law as kin-state policy

Although less widely employed than benefit law, citizenship law as a tool for nation-building across state borders is also part of the repertoire of kin-state politics. It is important to note that preferential naturalization on ethnic grounds is not unique to post-communist countries. Past examples include the West German state, which provided preferential naturalization on the basis of ethnic belonging to Germans requesting “repatriation” from then-communist countries. Israel granted citizenship on similar grounds to Jews from Ethiopia and the Soviet bloc. Many states also grant citizenship to non-residents, including some EU member states, such as France, Germany, Spain and Sweden. Recognizing the diversity of approaches to citizenship policy within the EU, the European Convention on Nationality (adopted in 1997) stated that “[e]ach state shall determine under its own law who are its nationals” and that “each state is free to decide which consequences it attaches in its internal law to the fact that a national acquires or possesses another nationality.”

It is equally important to note, however, that multiple citizenship is currently viewed in EU states primarily as a benefit to individuals rather than as a tool for nation-building across state borders. In fact, the large-scale granting of multiple citizenship to non-resident members of external minorities holds the potential to disrupt current notions of political community. The examples of Croatia and Romania are suggestive. Newly independent Croatia with a population of approximately four and a half million adopted a citizenship law in 1993 that granted citizenship rights to ethnic Croatians abroad that number approximately 4 million people. Ethnic Croats outside Croatia today vote in general elections and hold reserved seats in the Croatian parliament. Romania changed its citizenship law in 2003 to grant citizenship, regardless of residence or intention to “repatriate,” to those who held Romanian citizenship before December 22, 1989 or their descendants who lost their citizenship involuntarily. Thousands of ethnic Romanians in Moldova voted in the highly-contested 2004 Romanian elections. Although “dual” voting rights may render more resources to minorities, this practice may also contribute to a sense of lost political power by those citizens who live in the country in which elections take place and have no equivalent “cross-voting” possibilities. This situation increases the potential for division among societies that kin-state policies propose to bridge. It is in this regard that the debate over the “dual citizenship” initiative in Hungary offers especially valuable lessons.